Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: A dual process account

© 2019 Springer Nature.This is the final published version of an article published in Psychological Research, licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-bution 4.0 International License. Available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01262-7.In this article, we address an apparent paradox in the literature on mental time travel and mind-wandering: How is it possible that future thinking is both constructive, yet often experienced as occurring spontaneously? We identify and describe two ‘routes’ whereby episodic future thoughts are brought to consciousness, with each of the ‘routes’ being associated with separable cognitive processes and functions. Voluntary future thinking relies on controlled, deliberate and slow cognitive processing. The other, termed involuntary or spontaneous future thinking, relies on automatic processes that allows ‘fully-fledged’ episodic future thoughts to freely come to mind, often triggered by internal or external cues. To unravel the paradox, we propose that the majority of spontaneous future thoughts are ‘pre-made’ (i.e., each spontaneous future thought is a re-iteration of a previously constructed future event), and therefore based on simple, well-understood, memory processes. We also propose that the pre-made hypothesis explains why spontaneous future thoughts occur rapidly, are similar to involuntary memories, and predominantly about upcoming tasks and goals. We also raise the possibility that spontaneous future thinking is the default mode of imagining the future. This dual process approach complements and extends standard theoretical approaches that emphasise constructive simulation, and outlines novel opportunities for researchers examining voluntary and spontaneous forms of future thinking.Peer reviewe

Native American Children and Their Reports of Hope: Construct Validation of the Children's Hope Scale

Child reports of hope continue to be utilized as predictors of positive adjustment; however, the utilization of the hope construct has not been assessed within the culturally diverse Native American child group. The present study investigated the applicability of the Hope theory among 96 Native American children in the Midwest. Measures included the Children’s Hope Scale and a Hope Interview. Native American children in the current sample appear to conceptualize hope as a way to reach goals as did the children in the normative sample. Results from the factor analysis demonstrate that the factor structure found in the current study was similar to the factor structure found in the standardization sample. Because of the similar Hope theory conceptualization and factor structure, interventions focused on the positive psychology construct of hope may be applicable within a Native American child population

Meaning in life: nature, needs, and myths

The authors first discuss the nature of meaning with a focus on three broad functions of meaning and two levels of meaning. Next, the authors discuss the need for meaning with a focus on the four needs for meaning (Baumeister 1991). Finally, the authors discuss some myths related to meaning, particularly the expectation that everything in life does (or will) make sense and have a reason. Throughout the chapter, the authors discuss ideas where the existential perspective and positive psychology perspective differ and could be integrated. Meaning in life likely serves several different functions. First, meaning helps individuals detect patterns in their environment. Such patterns can exist in the physical or social environment. The second function is communication. The third function is related to self-control. Meaning enables one to refer to cultural standards and think about long-term goals and therefore facilitates self-control. Meaning can exist on multiple levels (Vallacher and Wegner 1985). A high level of meaning involves complex and abstract relationships that span out across a large time frame. A low level of meaning is concrete and is in the present moment. The implications of moving to and from different levels of meaning are also discussed. The authors break down the need for meaning in life into four basic needs: purpose, values, efficacy, and self-worth. If all four needs are satisfied it will engender a sense of meaning in life. If one or more of the four needs is unfulfilled, one will be motivated to adjust their life in such a way that all four needs are covered. These four needs can be seen as unique motivations that facilitate making sense of and finding meaning in life